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Since the late 1980s, the concept of precaution has been incorporated into 
numerous international agreements and laws, as well as in domestic statutes and 
policies in many countries. This paper examines the international emergence of 
the concept and its application in Australia. Despite rapid growth in adoption of 
the so-called ‘precautionary principle’, the concept remains highly controversial, 
and its success in terms of improving environmental and natural resource 
management has been questioned. This paper argues that implementation 
guidelines are essential to ensure that precautionary decision making is 
consistent with good decision making principles, and to avoid unnecessary costs 
and the potential for perverse outcomes. Economists have an important role in 
contributing to these guidelines and in developing techniques for incorporating 
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The precautionary principle is a mandate to address uncertainty and to ensure that 
potential, though not well-defined or understood, hazards are taken into account in 
decision making. There is no universally accepted definition of the principle, or even 
agreement as to whether or not it is a principle. Since the late 1980s, the principle – in 
one of its many guises – has been incorporated into numerous international agreements 
and laws, as well as in domestic statutes and policies in many countries, including 
Australia. Despite rapid growth in its adoption, the principle remains highly controversial, 
and its success in terms of improving environmental and natural resource management, 
and of promoting sustainable development, has been questioned, by both proponents and 
opponents of the principle. 
Uncertainty describes situations where the nature of future possible events is known but 
probabilities cannot be assigned to their outcomes, or where there is ignorance about both 
what events are possible as well as their probabilities.
1
 Uncertainty is pervasive in 
regulatory and policy decision making, particularly in the field of environmental and 
natural resource management. Uncertainty arises from many sources, including 
incomplete understanding of natural processes and phenomena and of complex 
socioeconomic systems. In addition, there is uncertainty regarding the preferences of 
future generations, and of future resource endowments, products and technologies. 
Increasing awareness of serious environmental degradation and damage to human health 
– in some cases, many years after potential hazards were first identified and no action to 
address them was taken – prompted pressures for anticipatory action to deal with 
potential, uncertain hazards (EEA 2001; OECD 2002).  
… not only known risks, but also potential risks to the environment and human health may 
need to be addressed; when there is a rational basis for concern, when their nature or 
magnitude is uncertain, and when a causal link with a certain action or process is not fully 
established. … This notion of precaution is based upon the assumption that in certain cases, 
scientific certainty, to the extent that it is obtainable with regard to environmental issues, may 
be achieved too late to provide effective responses to environmental threats. (OECD 2002, 
p. 6) 
The precautionary principle was conceived as a means to ensure that decision makers 
would take into account uncertain but potentially serious and/or irreversible threats of 
harm. Decisions may be considered to have been ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ in hindsight, but at 
the time of decision making, policy makers may face major information gaps and a range 
of conflicting scientific opinions. Doing nothing is a decision in itself. 
 
1 Risk describes situations where there is uncertainty about which outcome will eventuate, but the 
range of all possible events is known and objective probabilities can be assigned to each and 
every possible event. Under situations of uncertainty, the range of all possible events/outcomes 
is known but there is insufficient information to permit objective probabilities to be assigned 
(Knight 1921). Ignorance (or radical uncertainty) is where objective (or sometimes even 
subjective) probabilities cannot be assigned to outcomes and the full range of possible events 
cannot be identified. Other terms used to describe types of uncertainty include ‘indeterminacy’ 
and ‘ambiguity’. See Harding and Fisher 1999; O’Riordan, Cameron and Jordan 2001, pp. 24–
25; Peel 2005, pp. 43–44; Wills 1997, 2006.    
In practice, the precautionary principle has proven difficult to apply, due largely to the 
absence of a clear formulation of the principle, and a lack of clear guidelines on when and 
how to apply it. This has created difficulties for public decision makers, uncertainty for 
business, opportunities for legal challenges to environmental policies and regulatory 





The paper begins with a brief examination of the origins and development of the 
precautionary principle. Key formulations of the principle are presented and a 
classification system is described and applied. The significance of differences between 
various formulations is highlighted. Criticisms are then discussed, with many found to 
relate to extreme definitions of the principle or poor implementation. 
Definitions of the principle adopted in Australian environmental and natural resource 
management and key legal decisions on its application are considered next. Application 
of the principle in Australian environmental and natural resource management decision 
making raises the question of whether there is sufficient advice available to achieve 
clarity and consistency. Many of the implementation problems experienced in Australia 
follow from the absence of official guidelines to assist decision makers. An assessment of 
a number of guidelines, developed overseas to clarify how precaution should be applied 
in decision making, concludes the paper. These may provide a useful starting point for the 
development of Australian guidelines for managing uncertainty. The application of such 
guidelines would be enhanced by further development of techniques for managing 
uncertainty in decision making. The paper notes a number of promising techniques for 
consideration. 
2.  Origins and development of the precautionary 
principle  
The precautionary principle originated in Europe in the early 1970s, with the 
development of the German concept Vorsorgeprinzip which advocated ‘long term 
planning to avoid damage to the environment, early detection of dangers to health and the 
environment through comprehensive research, and acting in advance of conclusive 
scientific evidence of harm’ (LaFranchi 2005, p. 681). The first explicit reference to the 
precautionary principle was in 1987 in the Second International Conference on the 
Protection of the North Sea, which stated that marine ecosystems should be safeguarded 
with the best available technology, ‘even where there is no scientific evidence to prove a 
causal link between emissions and effects’ (Ministerial Declaration Calling for Reduction 
of Pollution). Despite a growing body of scientific evidence indicating substantial 
damage to the North Sea marine environment, pollution control regulations had, until 
then, been rejected due to the absence of definitive scientific proof of environmental 
damage. The Ministerial Declaration aimed to remove uncertainty as a barrier to action 
(Hanson 2003). 
It was not until the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
that the precautionary principle achieved broad international recognition. The principle 
was included in the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development where it was 
positioned as an underlying element of the broader framework for sustainable 
development. It was further promulgated in the 1992 UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change and the 1992 UN Convention on Biological Diversity. The precautionary 
principle has, since then, spread rapidly in multilateral agreements, international laws, 
and domestic laws and policies, dealing with climate change, biodiversity, endangered  
 
species, fisheries management, wildlife trade, food safety, pollution controls, chemicals 




In Europe, the precautionary principle became one of the foundations of European Union 
(EU) environmental policy, with its inclusion in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty on the 
European Union (Andorno 2004). Although this Treaty is not binding on policy makers 
unless implemented through directives or domestic legislation, the precautionary 
principle has been subsequently applied in a broad range of environmental and public 
health and safety legislation and policies in the European Union. (See Annex III of OECD 
2002 for examples of uses of precaution in the legislation of Member countries.) 
Although US legislation and policies avoid the use of the term ‘precautionary principle’, 
the adoption of a precautionary approach is widespread in US legislation and regulations 
(Christoforou 2004; EEA 2001; Goklany 2001; Goldstein and Carruth 2003; LaFranchi 
2005; OECD 2002). Examples include those relating to food additives, air and water-
borne pollutants, environmental safety (such as the ban on CFCs), fisheries management, 
endangered species, public health (such as the ban on the use of DES as a growth 
promoter in beef), and toxic chemicals (CEC 2003; OECD 2002).  
In Australia, the precautionary principle is one of the guiding principles of ecologically 
sustainable development (ESD) included in the National Strategy for Ecologically 
Sustainable Development (ESD Steering Committee 1992) and in the Inter-Governmental 
Agreement on the Environment (IGAE) (Australian Government 1992, para. 3.5.1). The 
IGAE provides an overarching framework for environmental and natural resource 
management in Australia. The precautionary principle is also a key component of the 
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC Act), a 
significant piece of legislation with broad applicability to environmental, natural resource 
management, and conservation activities. References to the principle have been 
incorporated into many laws and policies including fisheries legislation, management of 
the Great Barrier Reef, rules governing the grant of development approvals, and other 
natural resource management policies.  
3.  The meaning of precaution  
There are numerous definitions of the precautionary principle. A classification system 
proposed by Cooney (2005) is discussed in section 3.1. The wide range of potential 
precautionary actions, from ‘wait and see’ to prohibition of action, are outlined in section 
3.2. Finally, some comments are made in section 3.3 about whether the concept of 
precaution constitutes a principle or an approach.  
3.1  Definitions of the precautionary principle 
The most widely quoted statement of the precautionary principle is the one formulated at 
the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development: 
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by 
States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, 
lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective 
measures to prevent environmental degradation. (Principle 15, Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, 1992)    
Much criticism of the precautionary principle has focused on the lack of a clear definition 
(Majone 2002; Marchant and Mossman 2004; Sandin 2004; Treich 2001; Turner and 
Hartzell 2004). The Rio definition is not universally accepted and there are many 






Advocates of the precautionary principle have been criticized for failing to provide a precise 
operational definition of the principle. … [T]his criticism is misplaced. Any precise definition 
implies the existence of a well-defined formal analytical model within which the principle 
may be applied. But the incompleteness hypothesis states that any such model will exclude 
relevant factors. Hence, the precautionary principle must necessarily be considered as a 
heuristic check on decision making procedures rather than as a rule to be applied within a 
given formal framework.  
While most definitions share common features, the differences between the numerous 
statements of the principle complicate the task of interpreting what the principle means 
and how it should be applied to environmental and natural resource management issues. 
The main areas of difference among the various statements of the principle are: 
1.  What level of threat or potential for harm is sufficient to trigger application of the 
principle (the threshold of harm)?  
2.  Are the potential threats balanced against other considerations, such as costs or 
non-economic factors, in deciding what precautionary measures to implement? 
3.  Does the principle impose a positive obligation to act or simply permit action?  
4.  Where does the burden of proof rest to show the existence or absence of risk of 
harm?  
5.  Is liability for environmental harm assigned and, if so, who bears liability? 
Based on these differences, Cooney (2005) suggests categorising the different versions of 
the principle as ‘weak’, ‘moderate’ or ‘strong’ (adapted from Wiener 2002). This 
approach has been applied to the key international definitions of the principle in Box 1.  
3.1.1 Weak  formulations 
The most widely-cited and influential international definitions of the principle, namely 
those contained in the Rio Declaration and other UN agreements, fall into the weak 
category. One of the key characteristics of the weak formulation is that ‘lack of scientific 
certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing action’. As Wiener (2002, 
p. 1520) notes, weak formulations act as a ‘rebuttal to the mistaken claim that uncertainty 
warrants inaction.’ However, this form does not require action to prevent environmental 
damage once the threshold has been satisfied.  
Under the weak, or least restrictive, form, the precautionary principle comes into play 
when threats of harm are ‘serious’, ‘irreversible’ or ‘significant’. To satisfy the threshold 
of threat, there must be some evidence relating to both likelihood of occurrence and 
severity of consequences. Scientific uncertainty alone or the possibility of environmental 
damage below the threshold level will not satisfy the threshold test for precautionary 
measures. 
Many, but not all, weak formulations are qualified by an explicit requirement to consider 
the costs of precautionary measures. The Rio Declaration and the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, for example, both require that precautionary measures 
should be ‘cost-effective’. Cost-effectiveness means achieving the stated objective using 
the minimum level of inputs. Cost-effectiveness analysis is often used as an alternative to 






Box 1  Key international formulations of the precautionary 
principle 
Weak formulations 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 1992 (Principle 15): In order to protect 
the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to 
their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to 
prevent environmental degradation.  
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992: The Parties should take 
precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimise the causes of climate change and 
mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of 
full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures, taking 
into account that policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so 
as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost.  
Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development in the Economic 
Commission for Europe Region, 1990: In order to achieve sustainable development, policies 
must be based on the precautionary principle. … Environmental measures must anticipate, 
prevent and attack the causes of environmental degradation. Where there are threats of serious 
or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for 
postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation.  
UN Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992: Noting also that where there is a threat of 
significant reduction or loss of biological diversity, lack of full scientific certainty should not 
be used as a reason for postponing measures to avoid or minimise such a threat.  
Moderate formulations 
Third International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea,  Ministerial 
Declaration, 1990: The participants … will continue to apply the precautionary principle, that 
is to take action to avoid potentially damaging impacts of substances that are persistent, toxic, 
and liable to bioaccumulate even where there is no scientific evidence to prove a causal link 
between emissions and effects.  
UK Biodiversity Action Plan, Department of the Environment, 1994 (para. 6.8): In line 
with the precautionary principle, where interactions are complex and where the available 
evidence suggests that there is a significant chance of damage to our biodiversity heritage 
occurring, conservation measures are appropriate, even in the absence of conclusive scientific 
evidence that the damage will occur.  
Strong formulations 
Wingspread Statement on the Precautionary Principle, 1998: When an activity raises 
threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken 
even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically. In this 
context the proponent of an activity, rather than the public, should bear the burden of proof. 
Earth Charter, 2000 (article 6): Prevent harm as the best method of environmental protection 
and, when knowledge is limited, apply a precautionary approach. Take action to avoid the 
possibility of serious or irreversible environmental harm even when scientific knowledge is 
incomplete or inconclusive. Place the burden of proof on those who argue that a proposed 
activity will not cause significant harm, and make the responsible parties liable for 
environmental harm.  
    
A cost-effectiveness study cannot by itself demonstrate a conclusive case for or against 
the appropriateness of a proposal, because it is concerned only with possible alternative 
unit costs, and not whether the total costs are likely to be exceeded by the total potential 
benefits. In other words, the effect, although achieved as cheaply as possible, may not be 
worth the cost. However, weak versions do not preclude a weighing up of benefits against 
costs. Factors other than scientific uncertainty, including economic considerations, may 





Under weak formulations, the requirement to justify the need for action (the burden of 
proof) generally falls on those advocating precautionary action. No mention is made of 
assignment of liability for environmental harm. 
3.1.2 Moderate  formulations 
In moderate versions of the precautionary principle, the threat of environmental damage 
justifies or requires action to address the threat. Such formulations may not be as different 
from weak versions as they may first appear, because precautionary measures (action) 
may include ‘wait and see’ approaches (see section 3.2). However, the language is 
certainly stronger and may be suggestive of stronger forms of action. 
Usually, there are no explicit qualifications requiring proposed precautionary measures to 
be assessed against factors such as economic or social costs. In addition, the trigger for 
action may be defined less rigorously, for example, as ‘potential damage’, rather than 
‘serious or irreversible’ damage as in the weak version. Liability is not mentioned, and 
the burden of proof remains unchanged. 
3.1.3 Strong  formulations 
Strong versions of the principle differ significantly from the weak and moderate versions 
in reversing the burden of proof. Like moderate formulations, strong versions justify or 
require precautionary measures. The threshold for action varies, sometimes expressed 
simply as ‘harm’. Some strong versions, for example, that of Earth Charter, establish 
liability for environmental harm (a strong form of ‘polluter pays’). 
Under the reversal of proof, proponents of an activity with potential for harm – whether 
serious or minor – are required to prove that the product, process or technology is 
sufficiently ‘safe’ before approval is granted. Virtually no human actions are risk-free, 
including actions designed to address environmental degradation. Inherent scientific 
uncertainty, which the precautionary principle is designed to address, thwarts attempts to 
definitively prove safety, even for products and processes for which no plausible hazards 
have been identified. Requiring proof of no environmental harm before any action can 
proceed implies the public is not prepared to accept any environmental risk, no matter 
what benefits might arise (such as economic or social benefits). At the extreme, such a 
requirement could ‘involve bans and prohibitions on entire classes of potentially 
threatening activities or substances, without the option for proponents or others to 
demonstrate that they are harmless’ (Cooney 2005, np). However, the standard of proof, 
such as ‘reasonable certainty’ of safety or safety ‘on the balance of probabilities’, can 
moderate the potential negative economic and social impacts from reversing the burden 
of proof.  
Official statements of the precautionary principle do not generally fall within the strong 
category. Most strong versions are framed by private organisations and, as such, have no 
international or domestic legal status. Earth Charter, for example, is a community-based  
 
environmental organisation, while the Wingspread Statement emerged from a conference 
of scientists, academics and environmental activists. Both the Earth Charter version and 





The particular formulation of the precautionary principle applied by decision makers will 
be a major factor determining the economic consequences of precautionary measures. 
The economic effects of different formulations of the principle are considered further in 
section 4. 
3.2  Options for precautionary action 
Much opposition to the application of precautionary approaches to natural resource and 
environmental management derives from a belief that the precautionary principle requires 
the prohibition of activities associated with uncertain, but potentially serious, 
environmental damage. Yet none of the three formulations of the principle specify the 
nature of any precautionary measure that must be taken, and there are many, often quite 
varied, ways to approach and implement precaution (CEC 2003).  
Some options for precautionary measures are listed in Box 2. Options range from a ‘wait 
and see approach’ where the issue is reviewed when better information becomes 
available, through the adoption of flexible policies that can be adapted in response to new 
information, to prohibition (either temporary or permanent). Options may be combined, 
for example, an action might be temporarily prohibited while research examines 
alternative options. The appropriate course of action will depend on the circumstances of 
each case, which include: 
Q  the extent and significance of the information gaps and uncertainties, and the 
prospects and potential costs and benefits of obtaining better information in the future; 
Q  the seriousness of possible hazards, including the possibility of catastrophic events, 
and society’s degree of risk aversion; 
Q  the incidence of damage, for example, whether those likely to be most seriously 
affected are children (where larger safety factors are often applied), whether adverse 
effects are concentrated on future generations, or whether environmental impacts will 
have large flow-on effects through ecological systems;  
Q  the capacity, and ease or difficulty, of altering policies in the future, which may 
depend on whether policy measures would require, or generate incentives for, long-
lived investments; and 
Q  the potential costs and benefits to society of each alternative course of action. 
3.3  ‘Principle’ or ‘approach’?  
There has been considerable debate over whether any of the various expressions of the 
concept of precaution are appropriately described as a ‘principle’ or as an ‘approach’. A 
common (layperson’s) definition of a principle is ‘a fundamental truth or law as the basis 
for reasoning or action’ (Moore 2004). Opponents to the label ‘principle’ consider that 
the concept falls well short of this standard. Some suggest that the use of the term 
precautionary ‘principle’ dictates a ‘hard line’ approach involving mandatory risk averse 
action, sometimes involving complete prohibition of certain activities, whenever there are 
potential threats to the environment or to human health, and regardless of any balancing 





Box 2  Some options for implementing precaution 
Q  Deferral of a decision until more information is available (‘wait and see’ approach). 
Q  Research into alternative, less damaging options, and/or provision of funding for the 
development of such alternatives.  
Q  Mandatory environmental impact assessments, which increase the amount of information 
available to decision makers and may identify uncertainties and potential hazards 
associated with the proposed activity. 
Q  Inclusion of ‘safety margins’ or ‘uncertainty factors’ in risk assessments. Safety margins 
are commonly applied in assessing risks from exposure to toxic substances and non-
carcinogenic food additives. 
Q  Adaptive management involving the identification of knowledge gaps, ongoing 
monitoring and research to improve the knowledge base, and incorporation of flexibility 
and reversibility into decisions so that measures can be modified in line with advances in 
information.  
Q  Actions to increase the resilience of social or ecological systems, that is, their capacity to 
recover from or adapt to changed conditions. 
Q  Use of the best available technology. 
Q  Imposition of conditions on the use of new products, processes or technologies, and 
monitoring of environmental or public health and safety impacts. 
Q  Requirements for pre-approval or product registration prior to placing products on the 
market, or for obtaining permits to undertake specific activities. Examples include: 
approvals required to permit the sale or use of food additives, drugs, medical devices, or 
pesticides; licensing of hazardous waste facilities, nuclear power plants, aquaculture 
operations, and commercial fishing; and permits for development proposals and water 
diversions. 
Q  Banning of an activity until there is ‘reasonable certainty’ of safety.  
Q  Banning of the activity until there is strong evidence of safety. 
 
Sources: Compiled from Cameron 1999; CEC 2003; Deville and Harding 1997; Gullett 1997; 
Wills 2006; Young 1993. 
 
 
A precautionary ‘approach’ is argued to allow for flexible context specific measures, a 
balancing of various objectives, and a weighing of expected costs and benefits (Cooney 
2005; OIRA 2003). Peel (2005, p. 2) observes that an ‘underlying theme of the debate 
between precautionary principle ‘proponents’ and ‘critics’ seems to be the mutual 
suspicion of the other’s social and political agenda’. To the extent that this is true, 
changing the label seems unlikely to reduce controversy. 
There is also debate over the status of the term ‘precautionary principle’ in the legal 
profession. Despite broad application of the precautionary principle in international law 
and policies, and its prominent role in several trade disputes, the OECD notes that none of 
the international tribunals (the International Court of Justice, the WTO Appellate Body, 
and the European Court of Justice) that have dealt with cases involving the principle have 
‘clarified the legal status of precaution, nor confirmed the existence of a precautionary 
principle as a principle of international law’ (OECD 2002, p. 13). Considerable conflict 
remains between the EU view of the principle as a ‘general customary rule of 
international law’ and the US view that the principle is no more than ‘an “approach” – the 
content of which may vary from context to context’ (WTO Appellate Body Report, 
quoted in Sindico 2005, pp. 27–28). Debate over the terminology used to describe the 
application of precaution in decision making is no doubt significant from a legal  
 
perspective. Greater legal clarity would provide a firmer legal foundation for decision 





Despite questions over the legal standing of the precautionary principle, and debate on the 
appropriateness of the use of the term ‘principle’, it is clear that precaution is widely 
applied in decision making concerning environmental and natural resource management. 
Widespread application of the precautionary principle indicates that, regardless of 
whether it is described as a principle or as an approach, it is recognised by many decision 
makers as a legitimate means of taking into account uncertainty in a range of decisions.  
The most important factor influencing outcomes is how precaution is actually 
implemented in decision making. Clear implementation and interpretation guidelines may 
potentially resolve many of the underlying difficulties perceived to arise from the use of 
the term ‘principle’ in the context of precautionary decision making. For the purposes of 
this paper, the two terms will be used interchangeably. 
4.  Criticisms of the precautionary principle 
Critics have identified potential problems with application of the precautionary principle, 
including harm to the environment and the imposition of significant costs on society. The 
likelihood of these problems arising depends on the specific formulation of the principle 
and the way in which it is implemented. Careful definition and good design of guidelines 
for implementation may help to avoid many of the problems associated with the principle. 
The most frequent criticisms of the principle are addressed below. 
4.1 Excessive  discretion 
Some commentators note that the major social choice and definitional problems involved 
in implementing the principle may confer a high degree of discretion on decision makers 
(PC 2004; Wills 1997). Excessive discretion may lead to unpredictable and inconsistent 
environmental management decisions, which create uncertainty and higher costs for 
businesses, and inhibit corporate planning (Harding and Fisher 1999; Wills 1997). 
A lack of clarity in how decisions have been made opens up opportunities for legal 
challenge, and the potential for courts to adopt an interpretation of the precautionary 
principle at odds with that intended by the policy maker. As Segal (1999, p. 77) observes, 
‘To leave the entire application of the principle to judicial discretion does not provide 
industry with sufficient guidance or certainty’. Some urgency attaches, therefore, to the 
development of guidelines that place the precautionary principle within a framework of 
good regulatory practice, including transparency, accountability and effective 
consultation (see Box 4 in section 6).  
4.2  Reversal of the burden of proof 
Some critics oppose the precautionary principle on the grounds that a reversal in the 
burden of proof imposes excessive costs on developers and producers. Most regulatory 
regimes, such as development approvals and licensing systems, require developers and 
producers to provide, at their own expense, evidence about the proposed activity and its 
consequences. It is not clear, except perhaps under some strong versions of the principle, 
that a reversal in the burden of proof under the precautionary principle would be    
significantly more onerous than existing obligations. A more important factor influencing 





Assignment of the burden of proof does not necessarily dictate who will pay the costs. 
Some of the guidelines developed for applying the precautionary principle address the 
question of reversal of proof and indicate how the costs of scientific assessment of safety 
should be distributed. These guidelines are discussed in section 6.2. 
4.3 Distortion  of  regulatory priorities 
Concerns have been expressed that application of the precautionary principle may distort 
regulatory priorities (Majone 2002), by causing a loss of focus on the most dangerous 
hazards (Goldstein and Carruth 2003), and redirecting regulatory attention from ‘known 
or plausible hazards to speculative and ill-founded ones’ (Graham 2004, p. 1). Such an 
outcome may impose significant costs on society and may even increase the overall 
amount of environmental damage. Distortions to regulatory priorities are less likely under 
weak formulations of the principle, which require that potential hazards are ‘serious or 
irreversible’, often qualified by a requirement for an assessment of costs.  
4.4 Stifling  of  development  and technological innovation 
A frequent criticism is that application of the principle will stifle technological innovation 
and paralyse development (Hahn and Sunstein 2005; Goldstein and Carruth 2003; 
Graham 2004). Weak versions of the principle are unlikely to have this effect as they do 
not require precautionary measures and there is no reversal of the burden of proof. The 
effect of stronger versions will depend on how they are implemented, for example, the 
standard of proof of safety that is required. 
Supporters of the principle suggest that its application may promote the development and 
implementation of safer, technologically feasible and commercially viable alternatives 
that are discounted when potential hazards to the environment or human health are 
ignored (EEA 2001; LaFranchi 2005). A UK Government working group found that:  
Properly applied it is a positive, proportionate policy tool to encourage technological 
innovation and sustainable development by helping to engender stakeholder confidence that 
appropriate risk control measures are in place. (ILGRA 2002, p. 4, emphasis added) 
4.5  Costs of precautionary measures 
Some critics highlight the costs of measures taken to avoid potential, but uncertain, risks 
(Cross 1996). Such criticism frequently overlooks or discounts the potential benefits from 
precautionary measures in terms of avoiding or minimising damage to human health and 
the environment. The European Energy Agency (EEA) suggests an explanation for such 
discounting of potential benefits:  
The costs of preventative actions are usually tangible, clearly allocated and often short term, 
whereas the costs of failing to act are less tangible, less clearly distributed and usually longer 
term (EEA 2001, p. 3).  
The case studies presented by the EEA (2001) indicate that the benefits from avoiding 
some hazards may be substantial (for example, the experience with asbestos). Of course, 
due to the existence of uncertainty, some anticipated hazards may prove to be either 
overestimated or unfounded (see, for example, the case studies in Lieberman and Kwon 
2004).  
 
Another reason for the discounting of potential benefits may be that scientific uncertainty 
about the probability of harm, or even about the specific nature of potential hazards, leads 
to a downgrading of the benefits of avoiding such hazards. If such hazards do not 
eventuate, expenditures on measures to avoid the potential hazard are seen as wasted. 
However, even if later information shows that the expected hazard does not eventuate, a 
decision to take regulatory measures to avoid the hazard will be optimal ex ante provided: 
(i) the expected benefits of precautionary measures outweighed the expected costs; (ii) 
the most cost-effective and efficient alternative was chosen; and (iii) all relevant 
information available at the time was taken into account. Decisions applying precaution 





4.6 Perverse  consequences 
A common criticism of the precautionary principle is that it may have perverse 
consequences, where the costs of precautionary measures exceed the costs of waiting 
until the anticipated risks are proven. Wills (1997, p. 58) argues that, where precautionary 
measures are costly but ultimately revealed to be ineffective, due to uncertainty about 
hazards and how to address them, ‘a risk-averse society could make things worse’. 
Goklany (2001), Cross (1996) and Lieberman and Kwon (2004) set out a large number of 
examples where regulations had perverse impacts. In most of these cases the perverse 
outcomes occurred because the negative consequences of the regulations were not 
assessed and weighed against the expected benefits prior to implementation. 
The risk of perverse outcomes from precautionary measures results from a failure to 
recognise that regulatory measures have costs, as well as benefits, and may themselves 
give rise to risks (eg Hahn and Sunstein 2005; OIRA 2003). According to Bodansky 
(1991, p. 43), the ‘precautionary principle seems to suggest that the choice is between risk 
and caution, but often the choice is between one risk and another’. A high potential for 
perverse outcomes may be associated with applications of the principle that are not based 
on an assessment of the consequences of precautionary measures.  
Because of uncertainty, no assessment of the risks of various alternatives can be 
definitive. However, the potential for perverse outcomes may be reduced by thorough 
assessment of the costs, risks and consequences of the policy options as well as of the 
potential environmental hazard, using the best information available at the time. Decision 
makers may have to determine appropriate risk trade-offs where all of the alternatives 
have associated risks. 
Full assessment of the costs, benefits and risks of potential hazards and of policy options 
for addressing these hazards, while seen as desirable, has been criticised as unrealistic 
(Goklany 2001; Wills 1997). Such assessments demand a considerable amount of 
‘scientific and economic information, in particular information about the degrees of 
uncertainty associated with different policies, the costs of precautionary measures, and 
their effectiveness in reducing future environmental damage and adjustment costs’ (Wills 
1997, p. 61). While some decisions may require additional research to obtain necessary 
information, decision makers have to accept that full information may never be available 
at reasonable cost. The precautionary principle was specifically formulated to assist 
decision makers in circumstances of limited information and scientific uncertainty. 
Implementation guidelines are important to ensure that decision makers undertake an 
assessment of the costs, benefits and risks associated with alternative courses of action.    
The guidelines should ideally give decision makers guidance on how to deal with 





4.7  Misuse as a protectionist barrier 
A final criticism frequently raised is that the precautionary principle is open to misuse 
and opportunistic manipulation by rent-seeking commercial interests (Gollier and Treich 
2003; Graham 2004; Majone 2002; Treich 2001). For example, commercial interests may 
oppose a new product or process that would compete effectively with existing products or 
processes on the grounds that it may have unproven adverse environmental or health 
impacts. In particular, it has been argued that the precautionary principle may be used as a 
disguised form of protectionism. 
The principle has been implicated in a number of trade disputes. For example, the 
European Union has referred to the precautionary principle, and a high desired level of 
protection, to justify import barriers to hormone-treated beef and genetically modified 
food products. The United States (and other countries) challenged the import bans on the 
grounds that there was no scientific evidence of potential harm to human health from 
either the hormones used in beef or from genetically modified foods. 
The WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS 
Agreement) applies to trade restrictions implemented for environmental and human 
health protection. While the Agreement does not specifically refer to the precautionary 
principle, it states: 
… in cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member may provisionally 
adopt sanitary or phytosanitary measures on the basis of available pertinent information … 
Members shall seek to obtain the additional information necessary for a more objective 
assessment of risk and review the sanitary or phytosanitary measure accordingly within a 
reasonable period of time. (Article 5.7) 
The SPS Agreement has been seen as sanctioning the use of precautionary measures to 
address scientific uncertainty (Sindico 2005; WTO 1998). It is important to note, 
however, that the Agreement requires that such measures are taken in the context of risk 
assessment and identification of potential hazards. Although the WTO upheld the 
European Union’s right to determine an appropriate level of protection for its citizens, it 
decided in 1998 that the ban on hormone-treated beef was in breach of the SPS 
Agreement because no risk assessment had identified plausible health risks from the 
hormones used to produce the beef (WTO 1998). This decision accords with the OECD 
view that:  
Invoking precaution in situations where … there is no risk, or the risk is very negligible, or 
where there is a perceived risk for which there is no scientific basis, may be seen as a misuse, 
or abuse, of the concept. Such abuse could lead to undesired consequences, such as imposing 
disproportionate costs on society and business, stifling technological innovation, or creating 
unjustified trade barriers. (OECD 2002, p. 8) 
4.8  Avoiding the shortcomings of the precautionary principle 
In summary, some of the alleged shortcomings of the precautionary principle appear to be 
due to a lack of care in interpretation. Many may be avoided or minimised by good 
implementation processes. Under strong versions, there may be no attempt to assess the 
costs, benefits and risks of various hazards and options to prevent them. Implementation 
of precautionary measures that are not justified by some weighing of potential costs and  
 
benefits may expose society to substantial costs with, in some cases, no real benefits for 




                                                
Weak formulations of the principle generally avoid many of the problems associated with 
stronger versions. They draw attention of decision makers to the issue of uncertainty, and 
do not allow the mere existence of uncertainty to be a reason to postpone action. 
However, they do not require action or prescribe the nature of measures to prevent 
potential harm. Weak versions incorporate thresholds of harm to avoid taking 
inappropriate actions to address trivial risks. Some weak statements of the principle 
require analysis of cost-effectiveness. Guidelines developed to support application of the 
principle may require some form of modified cost-benefit analysis to ensure that expected 
benefits outweigh expected costs.  
While guidelines will assist decision makers in applying the principle, the existence of a 
legal statement requiring the incorporation of precaution into decision making, and the 
form of words used in the definition of the principle, are important: the formulation of the 
principle can be pivotal in legal disputes, and without a legal foundation for the 
application of precaution, decision makers may lack authority to take precautionary 
measures. Guidelines with legal backing provide incentives to pay regard to them.  
5.  Application of the precautionary principle in Australia 
The precautionary principle has been firmly established in Australian environmental and 
natural resource management legislation. As well as being incorporated into a number of 
international treaties and agreements
2
 that Australia is party to, the principle has been 
incorporated into a multitude of domestic policies and statutes. But, despite broad 
application of the principle, no official implementation guidelines to support decision 
making have been adopted. Australian provisions, definitions and recent legal decisions 
on the application of the principle are considered next. 
5.1  Australian provisions for the precautionary principle  
Provision for the application of the precautionary principle is included in Australian 
legislation and policies in a variety of ways. It may be included directly, either as a 
legislative objective or as a more substantive legal provision. Or it may be implicitly 
incorporated through reference to the principles of ecologically sustainable development 
(ESD). Even when there is no explicit or implicit reference to the principle in legislation, 
it may still be legally relevant ‘because its widespread acceptance in the environmental 
policy context has imbued it with general relevance for environmental decision making’ 
(Gullett 2006, pp. 4–5).  
ESD is defined as ‘development that improves the total quality of life, both now and in 
the future, in a way that maintains the ecological processes on which life depends’ in the 
National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development (NSESD) (ESD Steering 
Committee 1992). The Strategy was endorsed by the Council of Australian Governments 
 
2 Including, for example, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), 
the UN Convention on Biodiversity, and the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary 






 Seven guiding principles are enunciated in the NSESD, including the 
precautionary principle, which states that: 
where there are threats of serious or irreversible environmental damage, lack of full scientific 
certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent environmental 
degradation.  
The precautionary principle is also one of four guiding principles of ESD included in the 
IGAE (Australian Government 1992, para. 3.5.1). The IGAE provides an overarching 
framework for environmental and natural resource management. The Environment 
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC Act), which applies to a broad 
range of environmental, natural resource management, and conservation activities, 
requires the Minister to consider the precautionary principle in decision making 
(s. 391(2)). Various statements of the principle are included in more than 120 Australian 
and state statutes and hundreds of non-binding policies (Dovers 2002). (See Peel 2005, 
Appendix A for a list of some of the main Australian legislation providing for application 
of the precautionary principle or precautionary approaches.)  
5.2  Australian definitions of the precautionary principle 
Australian definitions of the precautionary principle in Australian and state legislation 
and policies are generally very similar, in many cases being modelled on, or referring 
directly to, the definition included in the IGAE (see Box 3 and Peel 2005, Appendix A). 
Most of the examples in Box 3 refer to a risk of serious or irreversible harm. The majority 
state that a lack of full scientific certainty is not a reason to postpone measures to protect 
the environment, so that they do not require, action (one of the key characteristics of 
weak versions of the principle). A minority of legislation, such as South Australia’s 
Environment Protection Act 1993 and Tasmania’s Environment Management and 
Pollution Control Act 1994, differ from other formulations by omitting reference to a lack 
of scientific certainty as not being a reason to postpone precautionary measures. 
However, these formulations require only that ‘all aspects of environmental quality … are 
considered’ in decision making, rather than requiring or justifying action (as in moderate 
or strong formulations).  
As shown in Box 3, some, but not all, definitions include reference to measures being 
‘cost-effective’ or to an ‘assessment of risk-weighted consequences’. The EPBC Act, for 
example, makes no mention of costs or risk assessment. However, decision makers 
applying definitions that do not make reference to costs or consequences may 
nevertheless be influenced by the NSESD and IGAE provisions, either because they refer 
to these directly or because of their overarching nature. 
In addition to the precautionary principle, the guiding principles in the NSESD provide 
for the integration of short and long term economic, environmental, social and equity 
considerations into decision making; promotion of international competitiveness and a 
strong and growing economy; the adoption of cost-effective and flexible policy 
instruments; and broad community involvement in decision making. Decision makers are 







Box 3  Selected Australian formulations of the precautionary 
principle 
Commonwealth 
Inter-Governmental Agreement on the Environment 1992, para. 3.5.1: Where there are 
threats of serious or irreversible environmental damage, lack of full scientific certainty should 
not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation. In the 
application of the precautionary principle, public and private decisions should be guided by: (i) 
careful evaluation to avoid, wherever practicable, serious or irreversible damage to the 
environment; and (ii) an assessment of the risk-weighted consequences of various options.  
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999, s. 391: The Minister must 
take account of the precautionary principle in making a decision … to the extent he or she can 
do so consistently with the other provisions of this Act. The precautionary principle is that lack 
of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing a measure to prevent 
degradation of the environment where there are threats of serious or irreversible environmental 
damage.  
Gene Technology Act 2000: Where there are threats of serious or irreversible environmental 
damage, a lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing cost-
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.  
New South Wales 
Protection of the Environment Administration Act 1991: … if there are threats of serious or 
irreversible environmental damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason 
for postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation. 
Victoria 
Environment Protection Act 1970: (1) If there are threats of serious or irreversible 
environmental damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for 
postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation. (2) Decision making should be 
guided by: (a) a careful evaluation to avoid serious or irreversible damage to the environment 
wherever practicable; and (b) an assessment of the risk-weighted consequences of various 
options.   
South Australia 
Environment Protection Act 1993: … to apply a precautionary approach to the assessment of 
risk of environmental harm and ensure that all aspects of environmental quality affected by 
pollution and waste (including ecosystem sustainability and valued environmental attributes) are 
considered in decisions relating to the environment.  
Tasmania 
Environment Management and Pollution Control Act 1994: … to adopt a precautionary 
approach when assessing environmental risk to ensure that all aspects of environmental quality, 
including ecosystem sustainability and integrity and beneficial uses of the environment, are 
considered in assessing, and making decisions in relation to, the environment.  
 
Sources: Commonwealth and state legislation. 
 
 
In the IGAE, the three other principles of ESD relate to intergenerational equity, 
conservation of biological diversity and ecological integrity, and improved valuation, 
pricing and incentive mechanisms. The last principle requires that ‘environmental goals, 
having been established, should be pursued in the most cost-effective way’ (Australian 
Government 1992, para. 3.5.4). The three other ESD principles moderate the application 
of the precautionary principle, above and beyond the qualifications included in the 
definition of the principle itself (Harding and Fisher 1999).    
In much legislation, the precautionary principle is one of a number of factors to be taken 
into account in any particular decision, such as in the formulation of management plans 
under the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act 1975, and in the determination of total 
allowable catch limits under the NSW Fisheries Management Act 1994 (s. 30). The 
Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth) (ss. 3–4) requires decision makers to pursue 
fisheries exploitation objectives in a manner consistent with the precautionary principle 
simultaneously with more traditional fisheries management objectives of optimal resource 






                                                
5.3  Absence of Australian implementation guidelines 
Despite the broad application of the precautionary principle to environmental and natural 
resource management issues, there has been little attempt within Australia to develop 
official implementation guidelines.
3
 Gullett concludes that: 
Existing legislative and policy formulations are too vague or ambiguous to enable it [the 
precautionary principle] to be implemented systematically. Its practical use is currently limited 
because decision-makers are not bound to apply it and are in doubt as to how to apply it. 
(Gullett 1997, p. 64) 
The absence of implementation guidelines confers a significant degree of discretion on 
decision makers, and creates opportunities for legal challenge by those adversely affected 
by regulatory and policy decisions, generating costs for government agencies. Businesses 
may also incur costs as a result of uncertainty about the application of precaution or 
inconsistency in administrative decision making. Some businesses, for example, may 
initiate unsuccessful and costly litigation challenging administrative decisions, while 
others may incur expense in applying for approvals for which they have little chance of 
success. The next section considers recent Australian legal decisions applying the 
precautionary principle. 
5.4  Merits review of Australian applications of the precautionary 
principle 
There are a growing number of legal decisions involving the precautionary principle. 
Virtually all Australian cases have involved merits review of administrative decisions by 
tribunals or specialist courts, which have authority to substitute a new decision for the one 
under review. These tribunals and courts reach their own conclusions about the merits or 
reasonableness of the decision under review, which may involve examination of how the 
precautionary principle has been applied in the decision making process. 
To date, there has been no judicial review of the legality of the precautionary principle 
itself. Such review could potentially clarify the legal standing and interpretation of the 
principle in Australia, increasing certainty for those operating under the legislation and 
reducing litigation and the associated costs. Where court interpretations differ from those 
intended by policy makers, clarification of the courts’ approach would facilitate 
legislative review to ensure that policy makers’ intentions are accurately embodied in 
legislation. 
 
3 The Office of the Gene Technology Regulator has produced a risk analysis framework that 
includes guidelines for dealing with uncertainty in genetically modified organism licence 
applications (OGTR 2005). These guidelines may form a useful starting point for the 
development of broader Australian guidelines or specific guidelines for other policy areas.  
 




The most widely-quoted legal case on the application of the precautionary principle in 
Australia is that of Leatch v National Parks and Wildlife Service (1993) 81 LGERA 270. 
In that case, Justice Stein accepted, in the NSW Land and Environment Court, the 
relevance of the precautionary principle in the context of a lack of scientific certainty 
about the impact of a proposed road on an endangered frog species. Justice Stein 
considered the precautionary principle to be a ‘statement of common-sense’, requiring 
decision makers to adopt a ‘common-sense duty to be cautious’ where scientific 
uncertainty exists. Justice Stein’s ruling discussed methods of balancing different factors 
in decision making. He emphasised that taking a precautionary approach did not require a 
‘no risk’ policy but did require consideration of alternatives that protect the environment. 
The ruling in the case overturned the decision to proceed with construction of the 
proposed road on the grounds that there had been insufficient consideration of less 
environmentally damaging alternative routes. Justice Stein made clear his view that the 
precautionary principle was not simply a means of accounting for uncertainty in isolation 
but required the adoption of decision making procedures that balanced economic cost-
benefit analyses, scientific uncertainty and social concerns (Fisher and Harding 2001). In 
finding that an alternative road route had been rejected on the basis of a cost-benefit 
analysis that did not include environmental factors, Justice Stein stated: 
There are a number of environmental economic models which factor environmental values 
into cost/benefit analysis. Surely an approach which attempts to integrate economic and 
environmental factors is preferable. (Leatch v National Parks and Wildlife Service (1993) 81 
LGERA 270, pp. 285–6)  
While the Leatch case has been widely referred to in subsequent legal cases, most 
emphasis has been placed on the finding that the precautionary principle is a ‘common-
sense duty to be cautious’, with much less attention given to Justice Stein’s comments 
about the need to balance economic, environmental, social and other factors (Fisher and 
Harding 2001). Legal interpretations of the precautionary principle as a matter of 
‘common sense’ provide little guidance to decision makers on the procedures that should 
be followed to implement the principle, how it should be weighed against conflicting 
factors, or what action is required. Consequently, uncertainty remains about what 
decision processes to implement in order to satisfy the courts, in the event of legal 
challenge, that due regard has been given to the principle (Gullett 2006). 
In addition, there is some doubt about whether the precautionary principle is a legally 
binding principle when no statutory directions to apply or take account of the 
precautionary principle are included in the legislation in question (Bates 2002). For 
example, in Nicholls v Director-General of National Parks and Wildlife (1994) 84 
LGERA 397, the IGAE and other policies enunciating the precautionary principle were 
judged to ‘create no binding obligation upon the Director-General or this Court’ (the 
NSW Land and Environment Court). Legislative provision for the precautionary 
principle, such as s. 30(2)(c) of the NSW Fisheries Management Act 1994, would clarify 
for decision makers and those affected by their decisions when the principle is ‘a legally 
relevant, and, therefore, an obligatory consideration, in decision making’ (Bates 2002, 
p. 132).       





In Greenpeace Australia Ltd v Redbank Power Co Pty Ltd (1994) NSWLEC 178, 
development consent for a power station in the Hunter Valley was opposed on the 
grounds that its emissions would contribute to the greenhouse effect. In rejecting the 
application, the NSW Land and Environment Court stated that ‘application of the 
precautionary principle dictates that a cautious approach should be adopted in evaluating 
the various relevant factors in determining whether or not to grant consent; it does not 
require that the greenhouse issue should outweigh all other issues’. Evaluation of the 
various factors was seen as ‘a matter of government policy’. 
Balancing of the various factors involved in precautionary decision making has therefore 
been left to decision makers. These types of value judgements, requiring a balancing of 
economic, environmental, social and other factors, and taking into account society’s risk 
preferences, are appropriately a matter for governments, rather than courts. Public 
decision makers would benefit from guidance on the weights to apply in decision making. 
Modified cost-benefit analysis would assist in clarifying the choices and trade-offs to be 
made in each decision process (see section 6.3). 
5.4.3  Decision maker discretion  
Some commentators have been concerned that, without clear guidelines, decision makers 
may pay only ‘lip service’ to the principle (Bates 2002, p. 132). Others consider that 
almost any decision can be seen as applying a precautionary approach (Fisher and 
Harding 2001). This view appears consistent with that expressed by Justice Talbot in the 
Alumino case that: 
the precautionary principle adds nothing to the consideration that the Court undertakes by 
applying common sense. It is obvious that where development involves the handling and 
processing of materials which have the potential to cause significant harm to the health of 
human beings and vegetation, extreme caution must be used in determining whether 
development consent will be forthcoming. (Alumino (Aust) Pty Ltd v Minister Administering 
the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979, unreported, Land and Environment 
Court, Talbot J, 29 March 1996, emphasis added). 
Similarly, in Friends of Hinchinbrook Society Inc v Minister for the Environment (1997) 
142 ALR 632 in the Federal Court, the Minister was considered to have taken a cautious 
approach by addressing the risks to World Heritage values identified in scientific and 
other reports available to him even though the precautionary principle was not explicitly 
mentioned in his decision. In many court judgements, application of the precautionary 
principle has apparently added little to conventional decision making ‘given that caution 
and commonsense are generally assumed to form the basis of environmental decision 
making and review’ (Peel 2005, p. 204). However, as Gullett (2006, p. 6) points out, in 
‘the absence of a unified detailed conceptualization of the principle … courts have had 
little ability to identify its legal content and have generally deferred to a department’s 
interpretation or application of legislation’. 
Implementation guidelines, and legislative provisions clarifying when the principle is to 
be applied, would promote consistency and greater certainty in the application of the 
principle. Guidelines would also provide decision makers with techniques for dealing 
effectively with uncertainty and information gaps, which may not form part of 
conventional decision making (Peel 2005). It is important to note, however, that some 
scope for administrative discretion will remain, just as it does in decision areas not 
affected by significant uncertainties. Attempts to eliminate discretion would result in  
 
excessive prescription and removal of the flexibility needed to take into account the 




                                                
5.4.4  The threshold test 
Despite the formulation of the threshold of threat in the IGAE and in most Australian 
legislation as ‘serious or irreversible damage to the environment’, Gullett (2006) 
identifies two divergent trends in rulings on the threshold for application of the principle 
in Australian case law. In several merit reviews of fisheries management decisions,
4
 the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal accepted the existence of uncertainty about the impacts 
of commercial fishing as sufficient to trigger the threshold for applying precaution in 
decision making, even though there was no evidence of a threat of serious or irreversible 
damage (Gullett 2006; Peel 2005). In contrast, in merit reviews of development 
decisions,
5
 courts have required credible evidence of ‘serious or irreversible damage’ in 
order to satisfy the threshold of threat (Gullett 2006). 
In determining what evidence of harm will satisfy the threshold, it appears that the courts 
have required more rigorous evidence in small-scale planning matters where the issues 
and uncertainties are seen as fairly straight-forward. In natural resource management 
decisions, involving more complex issues, large information gaps, high levels of 
scientific uncertainty, and the potential for serious and long-lasting damage in large 
ecosystems, the courts have accepted less objective evidence of threat as sufficient to 
satisfy the threshold test. In fisheries cases, for example, support for a finding of potential 
serious environmental damage – despite the absence of any scientific evidence of damage 
for a particular fishery – appears to have been inferred from past experience, such as the 
1942 collapse of the Californian sardine fishery and the 1992 collapse of the Canadian 
Northern cod fisheries (Peel 2005). Inferences may also have been drawn from evidence 
that many of Australia’s fish stocks have become over-fished (Caton and McLoughlin 
2004), despite the existence of management controls in those fisheries (Peel 2005). 
Gullett (2006 np) concludes: 
… no clear rule can be discerned from the cases and we are still yet to see a full judicial 
review challenge in Australia …[It is]…clear from the cases … that the various tribunals and 
merits review courts have differed with regard to what level of evidence satisfies the threshold 
test. Their variance is most likely attributable to the context of the decision at hand – whether 
it is a decision on natural resource management or on a small-scale planning matter. This 
reasoning is likely to inform any future judicial review cases.  
Unpredictability creates uncertainty and costs for businesses and others subject to 
precautionary decisions. As Gullett (2006) notes, although the precautionary principle is 
not a ‘rigid rule’, a threshold has been expressed in Australian legislation and ‘some legal 
meaning must be ascribed to it so that the principle cannot be a complete shield for public 
decision-makers and a blanket excuse for arbitrary action in the infinite number of 
environmental issues where uncertainty exists’ (Gullett 2006, np). Decision makers and 
 
4 Justice v Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA) (2001) AATA 49, Ajka Pty Ltd v 
AFMA (2001) AATA 258, and Ajka Pty Ltd v AFMA (2003) FCA 248. 
5 For example, Conservation Council of South Australia v DAC and Tuna Boat Owners 
Association (1999) SAERDC 86, Histpark Pty Ltd v Maroochy Shire Council (2001) QPEC 059, 
Commercial Crash Repairs Pty Ltd v Corporation of the city of Adelaide (2000) SAERDC 83, 
and Aldekerk Pty Ltd v City of Port Adelaide Enfield and Environment Protection Authority 
(2000) SAERDC 47.    
those affected by the decisions would benefit from access to guidelines that specify the 
nature and amount of evidence required to satisfy the threshold in different contexts. For 
example, evidentiary requirements may vary according to the level of uncertainty (such as 
where scientific information is so scarce that credible evidence demonstrating a potential 
hazard is unavailable, as in many fisheries) or the potential for large negative 
consequences (such as the catastrophic outcomes predicted by some scientists to result 





6. Implementation  guidelines 
It is argued in this paper that many of the shortcomings of the precautionary principle 
result from a failure to place the application of the principle within a framework of good 
regulatory practice. Scientific uncertainties and the potential for serious, irreversible or 
even catastrophic harm do not exempt precautionary decision making from normal 
standards of good regulatory practice. Without a full assessment of the costs, benefits and 
risks of alternatives, arbitrary invocation of the precautionary principle risks substituting 
one type of damage to the environment and human health with other unforeseen 
environmental and public health damage (see section 4.6 and the examples given in 
Goklany 2001; Cross 1996; Lieberman and Kwon 2004; PPP 2005). At the same time, 
substantial economic and social costs may be incurred, potentially leaving society worse 
off. 
High levels of uncertainty complicate the analysis of options, and necessitate guidelines 
to assist decision makers to deal with information deficiencies in a consistent and rational 
manner. As noted earlier in the paper, scientific uncertainty is endemic to environmental 
and natural resource policy making and regulation. 
6.1 Questions  for  implementation 
Existing formulations of the precautionary principle give little guidance to decision 
makers on how to implement the principle. Stronger versions generally leave open how 
decision makers should determine the threshold for action and the method for evaluating 
alternative courses of action. In contrast, most weak definitions set the threshold for threat 
of harm, being ‘serious’, ‘irreversible’ or ‘significant’. Some weak definitions direct 
decision makers to consider ‘cost-effectiveness’ or ‘the risk-weighted consequences of 
various options’. However, significant questions remain – how to define ‘serious’ and 
‘irreversible’, for example, when some actions may be reversible in theory but only over 
a very long time period and at substantial cost.  
More broadly, questions that remain problematic under most formulations of the principle 
include (Cooney 2005; Harding and Fisher 1999; Marchant and Mossman 2004; Wills 
1997, 2006): 
Q  how to treat conflicting or incomplete scientific information and opinion; 
Q  how to evaluate uncertainties and incorporate such evaluations into decision making; 
Q  how to choose ‘between different courses of action or conservation strategies which 
may each pose risks, of different sorts and over different timescales’ (Cooney 2005, 
np); and 
Q  how to balance competing interests and address distributional consequences.  
 




Increasing attention has been devoted in recent years to developing guidelines to apply 
the precautionary principle or, as it is termed in the United States, a precautionary 
approach. However, Fisher and Harding (2006, p. 171) note that ‘very little critical 
attention [has been] given to these frameworks. This is a considerable deficiency in the 
literature when one considers that these frameworks are one of the most important means 
of operationalising it’. Others (eg Gullett 1997; PPP 2005) have also called for the 
development of implementation guidelines. The guidelines considered in this paper are 
those developed by: 
Q  the European Commission (EC) in its 2000 Communication from the Commission on 
the Precautionary Principle (EC 2000); 
Q  the UK Government’s Inter-Departmental Liaison Group on Risk Assessment 
(ILGRA 2002);  
Q  the US Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs within the Office of Management 
and Budget (OIRA 2003); and 
Q   the Precautionary Principle Project, an environmental non-government organisation 
comprising Fauna and Flora International, IUCN–The World Conservation Union, 
ResourceAfrica and TRAFFIC (PPP 2005). 
These sets of guidelines for applying precaution in regulatory decision making will be 
assessed against the criteria for good regulatory practice set out in Box 4. The focus will 
be on identifying whether the guidelines ensure that decisions (including decisions to 
take no action or to defer action until more information is available) will be efficient, 
cost-effective and appropriate. 
6.2.1  EC and UK guidelines 
The European Commission’s 2000 Communication places the precautionary principle 
within the existing framework of risk analysis (EC 2000; Loefstedt 2004). The stated aim 
of the Communication is to establish guidelines for applying the principle and to ‘avoid 
unwarranted recourse to the precautionary principle, as a disguised form of 
protectionism’ (EC 2000, p. 3). Decisions must be based on scientific risk assessments 
and satisfy the following criteria:  
Q  Scientific evidence of risk – ‘Before the precautionary principle is invoked, the 
scientific data relevant to the risks must first be evaluated. … it is not possible in all 
cases to complete a comprehensive assessment of risk, but all effort should be made 
to evaluate the available scientific information.’ (EC 2000, p. 14) 
Q  Proportionality – ‘Measures based on the precautionary principle must not be 
disproportionate to the desired level of protection and must not aim at zero risk, 
something which rarely exists.’ (EC 2000, p. 18) Decision makers must consider less 
restrictive alternatives that make it possible to achieve an equivalent level of 
protection.  
Q  Non-discrimination and consistency – ‘Comparable situations should not be treated 
differently and different situations should not be treated in the same way.’ (EC 2000, 
p. 4) 
Q  Examination of costs and benefits – The overall costs, including non-economic 
considerations, to the European Union of action and lack of action must be compared. 
In weighing various costs and benefits, the protection of health takes precedence over 
economic considerations (EC 2000, p. 5). An economic cost-benefit analysis should 





Q  Examination of scientific developments – Precautionary measures should be 
maintained as long as the scientific data are inadequate, imprecise, and inconclusive, 
and as long as the risk is considered too high to be imposed on society (EC 2000, 
p. 5). 
Q  Assignment of responsibility for producing scientific evidence – While there will 
often be a reversal of proof, where the proponent of an activity must provide 
reasonable evidence of safety, ‘such an obligation cannot be systematically 
entertained as a general principle’ (EC 2000, p. 21). In some cases, there will be 
benefit in research funded by the public. 
The UK guidelines for implementing the precautionary principle have much in common 
with the European Commission’s guidelines. The UK guidelines require that: ‘Action in 
response to the precautionary principle should accord with the principles of good 
regulation, ie. be proportionate, consistent, targeted, transparent and accountable’ 
(ILGRA 2002, p. 2). There must be a comparison of the costs and benefits of action and 
inaction, including social and environmental costs (ILGRA 2002, p. 10). Decision making 
must be based on ‘standard procedures of risk assessment and management’ (ILGRA 
2002, p. 2), using ‘the best available scientific advice, taking into account the 
uncertainties’ (ILGRA 2002, p. 9). Accounting for uncertainties may require ‘making 
assumptions about consequences and likelihoods to establish credible scenarios’ (ILGRA 
2002, p. 2). Decisions must be reviewed when more information becomes available. 
As a general rule, the UK approach shifts the burden of proof to the proponent of the 
activity to provide the information needed for decision making, but ‘flexibility is needed 
and the extent to which the burden of proof shifts towards the hazard creator is 
determined case-by-case’ (ILGRA 2002, p. 11). Public funding for research may be 
appropriate when there is significant social value from getting the information and little 
prospect of it being generated within the private sector (ILGRA 2002). 
The guidelines developed by the European Commission and the UK Government 
demonstrate many of the features of good regulatory practice listed in Box 4. Both sets of 
guidelines require a comparison of the costs and benefits of precautionary measures and 
their alternatives (including no action). Economic cost-benefit analyses should be 
undertaken where sufficient information is available, as well as regulatory impact studies 
that incorporate social and environmental concerns. Regulatory action should be targeted 
at the objective of a desired level of protection. For the European Commission, the 
desired level of protection is high, but not zero-risk, which is recognised as unrealistic. 
Precautionary measures must be proportionate to the problem or hazard to be addressed. 
Wiener (2003, p. 251) describes the European proportionality principle as ‘a weighing of 
benefits and costs, conceptually equivalent to cost-benefit analysis (though perhaps less 
frequently quantitative in practice)’. 
In requiring formal assessments of costs and benefits, risk calculations, and a clear 
statement of the assumptions used in decision making, the EC and UK guidelines should 
improve the transparency, accountability and consistency of decision making. In addition, 
application of these guidelines – by placing constraints on the way the precautionary 
principle is to be incorporated into decision making – modifies the practical effect of 
moderate and strong versions of the principle. The guidelines may effectively ‘weaken’ 
the more stringent statements of the principle and thereby avoid some of the associated 






Box 4  Checklist for assessing regulatory quality 
Regulations that conform to best practice design standards are characterised by the following 
seven criteria: 
Q  Minimum necessary to achieve objectives 
-  Overall benefits to the community justify costs 
-  Kept simple to avoid unnecessary restrictions 
-  Targeted at the problem to achieve objectives 
-  Not imposing an unnecessary burden on those affected 
-  Does not restrict competition, unless demonstrated net benefit 
Q  Not unduly prescriptive 
-  Performance and outcomes focused 
-  General rather than overly specific 
Q  Accessible, transparent and accountable 
-  Readily available to the public 
-  Easy to understand 
-  Fairly and consistently enforced 
-  Flexible enough to deal with special circumstances 
-  Open to appeal and review 
Q  Integrated and consistent with other laws 
-  Addresses a problem not addressed by other regulations 
-  Recognises existing regulations and international obligations 
Q  Communicated effectively 
-  Written in ‘plain language’ 
-  Clear and concise 
Q  Mindful of the compliance burden imposed 
-  Proportionate to the problem 
-  Set at a level that avoids unnecessary costs 
Q  Enforceable 
-  Provides the minimum incentives needed for reasonable compliance 
-  Able to be monitored and policed effectively  
Source: PC 2003, p. 6. 
 
 
Both sets of guidelines require that the type of precautionary regulation adopted should be 
the least restrictive regulation needed to achieve the desired outcome, in order to avoid 
imposing unnecessary costs on society and on those directly affected. Precautionary 
measures must be reviewed in the light of scientific developments, and measures must be 
flexible enough to be modified or discontinued if justified by new information.  
The reversal in the evidentiary burden envisaged in both sets of guidelines has the 
potential to detract from the quality of regulatory decision making if applied 
indiscriminately. However, the guidelines state that proponents of new products, 
technologies and processes will be required to prove that regulation is not justified only in 
cases where a reversal in the burden of proof is judged to maximise benefits to society. 
Reversal of the evidentiary burden is not proposed to apply across-the-board to all 
regulatory decisions. This limit on the reversal of the burden of proof may reduce 
potential negative impacts. In addition, as noted in section 3.1, the standard of proof 
required to be demonstrated by proponents of an activity is important in determining the 
economic and social impacts of reversing the burden of proof. While the standard of 
proof is not defined in the EC or UK guidelines, the EC’s target of a high, but not zero,    
level of protection suggests that the standard of proof adopted in each case is likely to 





6.2.2 US  guidelines 
The United States has also developed guidelines for the application of precaution in 
regulatory decision making. While the US Government denies the existence of a 
‘precautionary principle’ (Graham 2004), the Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs states that: 
The United States employs precautionary approaches throughout the process of risk 
assessment and management so that the overall level of precaution in a given regulatory 
decision is appropriate. (OIRA 2003, p. 54) 
The US view is that precaution can only be sensibly applied within a framework of risk 
management, otherwise significant costs and distortions would result (Graham 2004). 
Decision making that incorporates precaution must be: 
Q  Based on an assessment of costs and benefits, and targeted towards government 
objectives – ‘When Federal decision makers decide the appropriate level of 
precaution in a specific decision, they need to consider … factors such as 
technological and economic feasibility, or more holistic benefit-cost balancing, 
including considerations of countervailing risks, depending on the statutory 
requirements to protect the public and the environment, and improve societal 
welfare.’ (OIRA 2003, p. 62) 
Q  Transparent and accountable – ‘new OMB guidelines for regulatory analysis require 
agencies to support rulemakings with formal probabilistic analysis of the key 
scientific and economic uncertainties regarding costs and benefits.’ (OIRA 2003, 
p. 59)  
Q  Based on scientific evidence – ‘decisions about how to respond to a potential hazard 
are intended to be made after – and are informed and guided by – a scientific risk 
assessment that is grounded in the weight of the scientific evidence’ (OIRA 2003, 
p. 53).  
Q  Subject to review and flexible enough to deal with new information – ‘the ability to 
modify policies as scientific understanding grows is critical to the appropriate 
application of precaution. The information collection, risk assessment, and risk 
management phases are not static … The management approach can be adapted in 
response to improved scientific information that reduces uncertainty in risk 
assessment (such as the magnitude and likelihood of consequences) as well as 
uncertainty in risk management (such as effectiveness of interventions and pace of 
technological advancements).’ (OIRA 2003, p. 57)  
Like the EC and UK guidelines, the US guidelines demonstrate many of the features of 
good regulatory practice listed in Box 4. There is an emphasis on weighing the costs and 
benefits of regulation to the community, through formal risk assessment and cost-benefit 
analysis. Regulations incorporating precaution must be performance- and outcomes-
focused, transparent and accountable, and targeted at achieving statutory objectives. They 
are open to review and modification when new scientific information becomes available. 
Although the US guidelines do not specifically mention a reversal in the burden of proof, 
some US regulations impose a requirement on proponents of new products, technologies 
or processes to prove why approval to market or use the product, technology or process 
should be granted. For example, requirements for pre-market approval prevent the sale or 
use of certain products, such as food additives, medicines, medical devices, and  
 
pesticides, unless they are proven to meet specified ‘safety’ requirements. Mandatory 
operating permits prevent the operation of hazardous waste facilities, nuclear power 
plants, fishing activities, trade in endangered species and other business activities without 
some prior demonstration of safety or the absence of significant environmental damage 





There appear to be significant areas of agreement between the US and European 
guidelines for implementing the precautionary principle. Some commentators have 
argued that the United States and Europe are converging in their approaches to applying 
precaution (Christoforou 2004; Loefstedt 2004; Wiener 2003). Differences remain in the 
degree of weight placed upon formal scientific and quantitative assessments compared to 
more qualitative risk assessments, in the treatment of uncertainty, and in the particular 
types of risks considered most serious (Christoforou 2004; Tickner and Raffensperger 
2001; Vogel 2003; Wiener 2003, 2004).  
6.2.3  Precautionary Principle Project guidelines 
The Precautionary Principle Project (2005) has recently released guidelines developed 
following a process of broad international consultation with a range of interested parties. 
The guidelines require: 
Q  explicit incorporation of the principle into legislation and policy, and establishment of 
‘adequately resourced institutions to carry out research into risk and uncertainty in 
environmental decision making’ (PPP 2005, np); 
Q  recognition that the principle must be balanced against other relevant principles, such 
as intergenerational equity, and basic human rights; 
Q  development of operational measures for specific policy areas that identify concrete 
actions to be taken in specific contexts but permit flexibility when circumstances 
change; 
Q  a transparent process of assessment, decision making and implementation based on 
broad public participation and the best available information (scientific and non-
scientific);  
Q  assessment of the threats and the environmental, economic and social uncertainties; 
Q  identification and assessment of options, including various courses of action and 
inaction, and their likely consequences (including any potential risks); 
Q  allocation of responsibilities for providing information and evidence of threat or 
safety, usually but not always involving a reversal in the burden of proof; 
Q  clear communication of the precautionary measures being taken and their basis; 
Q  proportionality, taking into account economic and social costs of measures; 
Q  equity in the distribution of economic and social costs; and 
Q  adaptive management, involving monitoring, research, periodic evaluation and 
review, and efficient and effective compliance.  
The Project guidelines take a somewhat different approach to that adopted by the three 
other sets of guidelines considered here. Several of the Project guidelines relate to the 
steps leading up to invocation of the principle, which, in the EC, UK and US guidelines, 
are dealt with in the scientific risk assessments undertaken prior to the implementation of 
precaution. (The scientific assessments factor in uncertainties, information gaps and 
precaution.) The Project guidelines provide less detail than the other sets of guidelines 
about the methods to be employed in assessing and comparing precautionary options. 
Instead, they place a greater emphasis on broad public participation and openness in the    
decision making process. Consequently, the Project guidelines may allow greater scope 
for discretion than the other guidelines although the scope to exercise this discretion may 
be restrained by the transparency of the process. Furthermore, the Project envisages the 






                                                
Despite the differences, there are many areas of agreement and the Project guidelines, like 
the other guidelines, demonstrate many of the features of good regulatory practice. The 
guidelines emphasise accessibility, transparency, effective communication, regular 
monitoring and review, and flexibility to adapt to new information. Precautionary 
measures must be proportionate to the hazard and all economic, social and environmental 
costs must be taken into account. These rules imply that some form of modified cost-
benefit analysis is required, in common with the EU and UK guidelines. Measures must 
be based on a formal risk assessment and the precautionary principle must be integrated 
with, and where necessary weighed against, other relevant principles. 
The main potential area of concern with the Project guidelines is its reversal of the burden 
of proof, except where the burden would fall on ‘poorer, vulnerable or marginal groups 
… [then] either these responsibilities and costs should be placed on relatively more 
powerful groups, or financial/technical support should be provided’ (PPP 2005, np). If 
applied with an extreme standard of proof, this rule has the potential to block 
development and the introduction of new products, processes and technologies. The 
standard of proof adopted is to be determined by the countries applying the Project’s 
guidelines, which ‘may have the right to establish their own chosen level of protection for 
their own biodiversity and natural resources’ (PPP 2005, np).  
6.2.4 Other  guidelines 
Other broad guidelines have been developed (eg Deville and Harding 1997; Government 
of Canada 2002). The guidelines developed by Deville and Harding (1997)6 for Australia 
have much in common with the approach adopted in the Precautionary Principle Project  
guidelines but they provide significantly greater detail on how to apply the various steps 
in the process. Specific guidelines have been developed for particular policy areas, for 
example, fisheries management (FAO 1995), genetically modified organisms (OGTR 
2005), and child health (WHO 2004).  
6.2.5 Findings 
Despite the development of guidelines for applying precaution and of methods for dealing 
with uncertainty, the precautionary principle will remain challenging to apply. 
Judgements about the range of possibilities, the effectiveness of various options to 
address the problem, and the assumed probabilities attached to the range of outcomes are 
unavoidable when there is uncertainty. While some uncertainties may be resolved over 
time, with research and the development of greater scientific knowledge and 
understanding, some uncertainties may never be resolved. Judgements must also be made 
about how much risk is acceptable, and how to balance economic considerations with 
other factors, such as environmental, health, and social concerns. 
Substantial benefits could be obtained from contributions by environmental and resource 
economists to the formulation of official guidelines for application by Australian decision 
makers to environmental and natural resource management problems involving 
 
6 Deville and Harding’s guidelines have no official standing.  
 
significant uncertainties. The task may be made easier by using existing guidelines as a 
starting point for developing guidelines suited to Australian circumstances and policy 
issues. The benefits from the development of official guidelines include greater 
consistency and predictability, improved transparency and accountability, and lower costs 
for businesses and government agencies. In addition, there will be greater confidence that 
the decision making process was optimal, leading to adoption of the most cost-effective 




6.3  Modified cost-benefit analysis 
Any application of a precautionary approach requires methods to deal with uncertainty. 
This may require an understanding of the sources of uncertainty and research to quantify 
the uncertainty where such quantification is possible. A common approach where it is 
impossible to assign probabilities to potential outcomes or even to identify all possible 
outcomes by ‘making assumptions about consequences and likelihoods to establish 
credible scenarios’ (ILGRA 2002, p. 2). Conventional cost-benefit analysis may need to 
be modified by incorporating assumptions about the potential hazards and expected 
responses to various management options. For example, Hahn and Sunstein and the FAO 
suggest a similar approach:  
Of course, the proper cost-benefit analysis can and should incorporate concerns about 
precaution. For example, a problem characterized by irreversibilities … can be modelled using 
standard techniques in cost-benefit analysis. Uncertainties about both benefits and costs can 
also be incorporated, perhaps by specifying a range of possible outcomes, perhaps by seeking 
to preserve specified options, or perhaps by identifying the worst-case scenario and showing a 
degree of risk aversion with respect to that scenario. (Hahn and Sunstein 2005, p. 6) 
A precautionary approach to assessment and analysis requires a realistic appraisal of the range 
of outcomes possible … A precautionary assessment would, at the very least, aim to consider: 
(a) uncertainties in data; (b) specific alternative hypotheses about underlying biological, 
economic and social processes, and (c) calculation of the theoretical response of the system to 
a range of alternative management actions. (FAO 1995, p. 11) 
The past decade has seen the development of new techniques to deal with uncertainty. 
These include formal modelling of choice under uncertainty (eg Quiggin 2005), formal 
modelling of policy choice with uncertainty and irreversibilities (eg Pindyck 2000, 2002), 
option valuation (eg Gollier and Treich 2003), environmental valuation techniques (see 
eg Bennett 2005; Wills 2006), intergenerational discounting (eg Arrow 1995; Sumaila 
and Walters 2005), minimax choice rules (see eg Majone 2002; Quiggin 2005; van den 
Bergh 2004; Wills 2006), and value-of-information theory (eg Macauley 2005). These 
techniques, perhaps with further development, may be useful in modifying conventional 
cost-benefit analyses to address uncertainties, information gaps, and large intertemporal 
disparities in the incidence of costs and benefits. 
7. Conclusions 
The precautionary principle requires decision makers to deal with threats of adverse 
environmental and public health consequences in the context of scientific uncertainty. 
There is no universal definition of the precautionary principle. Variants of the 
precautionary principle are widely applied, both internationally and in Australia.  
This paper argues that weak formulations of the precautionary principle are generally to 
be preferred to stronger versions. Weak formulations can serve as a useful reminder to    
decision makers that inaction is not necessarily the optimal response to uncertainty. Weak 
versions provide greater guidance to decision makers on thresholds for action. In 
addition, definitions incorporating ‘cost-effectiveness’ or ‘assessment of the risk-
weighted consequences of various actions’ provide a legal backing, as well as explicit 
incentives, for decision makers to take into consideration the costs, benefits and risks of 
alternative responses to uncertain hazards. Weak versions thus provide greater legal 
support for the application of implementation guidelines advocated in this paper. Most 
official versions, including Australian government statements of the principle, fall into 





The precautionary principle is, and will remain, challenging to apply. Decision makers 
will often be required to make judgements or assumptions about the range of possible 
outcomes, the effectiveness of various options to address the problem, and the assumed 
probabilities attached to the range of outcomes. Subjective judgements of this nature are 
unavoidable when there is genuine uncertainty. Decisions will also need to be made about 
what level of risk society is prepared to accept in various contexts. 
Although the application of precaution will always involve some degree of subjectivity, 
the development of clear guidelines for applying the precautionary principle nevertheless 
has major benefits. Placing the principle within the context of good regulatory practice 
helps to ensure that decision making is transparent, consistent and accountable; that it 
utilises all relevant information; that costs, benefits and risks are identified, assessed and 
compared; and that measures are targeted at, and proportionate to, the problem. This 
decision making framework will help to avoid many of the potential problems arising 
from application of the precautionary principle, including the risk of perverse outcomes, 
over-reaction to trivial risks, and misuse as a rent-seeking (or protectionist) measure.  
Without guidelines, Australian applications of the principle may suffer from a lack of 
clarity about implementation procedures, leading to inconsistencies, uncertainties and 
legal challenge to environmental and natural resource management decisions. A challenge 
for agricultural and resource economists is to contribute to the development of guidelines 
for precautionary decision making in the environmental and natural resource management 
area. Further research to develop methods to incorporate uncertainty into decision making 
would be also useful. 
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